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Perhaps the most hackneyed of all quotations in the philosophy 
of history is Ranke's remark that the task of the historian is "to 
show what actually happened"-though we are not so often told 
that Ranke's intention was to contrast showing what actually hap-
pened with judging the past and with instructing the present for 
the benefit of future ages. His remark was timely because judging 
the past and instructing the present were precisely what the ancients, 
who still served for models in his day, were wont to do. However, 
since Ranke's day it has become fashionable to deny that showing 
what actually happened is, or even could be, the historian's task. 
This has been denied for many reasons of varying kinds. Historians 
who set out with this ideal have concluded that it is but a 'noble 
dream,' because the experience of trying to write history with this 
aim and using the methods which this aim prescribes has led them 
to despair; the difficulties they encountered in the pursuit led them 
to conclude that the very aim was a mistaken one; and philosophers, 
setting out from some metaphysical or epistemological theory, have 
arrived at the same conclusion by a shorter route. 
It is not my intention in this lecture to canvass all the reasons 
that have been advanced for rejecting Ranke's Realist position 
about the past; in particular, I shall say nothing about one of the 
most popular and persuasive arguments: that historical narratives 
and explanations are necessarily 'subjective' because they are neces· 
sarily infected by the individual historian's own judgments of value. 
That is far too big and complex a topic to be handled alongside 
those that I do propose to discuss. The line of thought with which 
I am concerned can be summed up in another convenient slogan, 
Oakeshott's dictum that history is "what the evidence obliges us 
to believe." The word 'oblige' here is perhaps a bit strong. We are 
obliged to believe that Lincoln was assassinated in Ford's Theater 
on the 14th of April, 1865, because the evidence is so copious and 
so unassailable that it cannot be denied; but there is a great deal 
that is properly called history about which the most we can say is 
that the evidence is strong enough to make belief more reasonable 
than disbelief. Historical statements, Jike other empirical state· 
ments, occupy a range from those which it would be madness to 
doubt to those which are just a little more probable than noL The 
theory I want to criticise is the Constructionist theory, a theory 
that is arrived at, and can only he arrived at, by passing through a 
phase of scepticism. Roughly, the sceptic argues that there can be no 
such thing as historical knowledge at all; then the Constructionist 
tells us that there is no need to despair. We can, after all, have 
historical knowledge-only it is not the sort of thing that Ranke 
and his Realist followers thought it was. History is not an account 
of what actually happened but an account of what the evidence 
obliges us to believe; it is not about 'the real past,' but about 'the 
historical past,' which is something quite different-something con-
structed by the historian. 
The clearest exposition of the Constructionist position is that 
of Leon Goldstein, who writes: 
"When we say that the starting point is the evidence, we 
mean only that the suspicion that there were events is sug-
gested by the fact that there are present certain things which 
seem not to fit into the present context of culture and life: 
writings that most of us cannot read, coins which will buy 
nothing at the grocery, ruins of buildings and of entire cities, 
and so on."I 
So far, so good. Though historians do not in fact cast their writ-
ings in the form of inferences from the present existence of 'docu-
ments' to the past existence of events-their works would be un-
readable if they did-we are making a fair epistemological demand 
of them when we demand that they should be able to do so. If 
Oakeshott's slogan is taken to mean only that a historian is not 
entitled to assert anything 'as a fact' unless he can link it by a chain 
of acceptable reasoning to something that is here and now before 
his eyes, I have no quarrel with it-except the minor quarrel that, 
as I said, the word 'oblige' is too strong; some such phrase as 'puts 
beyond reasonable doubt' would be more appropriate. But Oake-
shott and Goldstein and, as we shall soon see, some philosophizing 
historians, intend to say something very much more surprising and 
contentious than this. In telling us that history is what the evidence 
obliges us to believe they are denying Ranke's position; they are 
1 Evidence and Events in History. Philosoplly of Science, Vol. 29, No. 2. 
1962, p. 176. 
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telling us that history is not an account of what actually happened. 
This is how Leon Goldstein continues: 
"No matter how diligently he has carried out his investiga-
tion, the historian never gets any nearer to the real past than 
he was when he began. The real past, whatever it was, has 
no more to do with history-the discipline-than Hylas' 
material substance has to do with the experienced objects 
that Philonous wants to talk about ... neither the thing as 
it exists apart from our experience of it nor the real past 
figures in any human activity .... The past that the historian 
evokes is not a real past as it was when it was present, but 
rather a construction of his own. . . . The historical event, 
the only historical event that figures in the work of historians, 
is a hypothetical construct."2 
This, which I call the Constructionist view, is by no means con-
fined to philosophers. Forty years ago the historian Carl Becker 
was saying much the same thing. In the course of an essay which I 
shall examine in more detail later he raises the questions 'Where 
is the historical fact?' and 'When is the historical fact?'. His an-
swers are 'Here and now in the mind of the historian.'3 
It is this view that Oakeshott's slogan conOicts with Ranke's and 
that Ranke's must therefore be rejected that I wish to examine: 
and I shall, in passing, suggest that the sceptical doubts on which 
Constructionism is based are bogus doubts. But not just bogus 
doubts. They are shadows, monstrous and terrifying Doppelgaenger, 
cast by very genuine difficulties that historians encounter-difficulties 
that are none the less genuine and none the less infuriating for being 
philosophically banal. 
That there is in fact no necessary conflict between Oakeshott's 
slogan and Ranke's can be easily shown. For if we ask Oakeshott 
and his followers just what the evidence obliges us to believe, will 
their answer not have to be: It obliges us to believe that Lincoln 
was assassinated in Ford's Theater on April 14th, 1865, that there 
was a battle fought near the village of Waterloo on June 18th, 1815, 
that Caesar crossed the Rubicon on some date not now precisely 
2 Goldstcin, op. cit. pp. 176·77. 
• What arc historical facts? Reprinted in Hans Meyerhoff (Ed.) Tile Plliloso-
phy of History in our time. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959, pp. 
120·37. 
5 
known in 48 b.c.? The evidence obliges us to believe that these 
things actually did happen. Consider the following sentences:-
(1} There was a battle at Waterloo in 1815. 
(2) There really was a battle at Waterloo in 1815. 
(3} The battle at Waterloo was a real battle. 
And let us suppose, what the Constructionist will not deny, that 
the evidence obliges us to believe (1). There are many contexts in 
which and purposes for which (1) would be the most appropriate 
of these three sentences to use to express our knowledge or belief 
that there was a battle at ·waterloo in 1815. By contrast, the range 
of contexts and purposes which would make (2) or (3) more ap-
propriate than (I) are severely limited. It would be appropriate 
to say (2)-that there really was a battle at Waterloo in 1815-to 
someone who has denied that any such battle took place or has 
expressed doubt about it. I can think of two quite different cases 
in which (3)-the battle of Waterloo was a real battle-would be the 
most appropriate sentence to select. A child asks his father whether 
the battle of ·waterloo took place before or after the battle between 
the Gods and the Giants. The battle of Waterloo, we tell him, 
was a real battle; that between the Gods and Giants was not. 
Secondly, sentence (3) might be used to assert that the battle of 
Waterloo was a real battle-not just a skirmish or affray. But 
what (2) and (3) assert is in no way different from what (I) as-
serts; and if the evidence obliges us to believe that there was a 
battle at Waterloo in 1815, it obliges us, by the same token, to 
believe that it was a real battle-something which actually hap-
pened. The illusion that it might not stems from the crude mis-
take of supposing that 'real' in the phrase 'real battle' functions in 
the way that 'bloody,' 'indecisive' or 'unnecessary' function. For 
we might be obliged by the evidence to believe that a certain battle 
took place but not obliged by the same evidence to believe that it 
was a bloody, indecisive or unnecessary battle; but we cannot be 
obliged by any evidence to believe that a battle took place with-
out being obliged by that same evidence to believe that a real battle 
took place. Moreover, if it was not a real battle and if it did not 
actually happen it could not explain the present evidence which, 
according to the Constructionists, it is the function of battles and 
other events to do. 
I assume, then, that it is sheer error to suppose that Oakeshott's 
slogan and the theory of historiography that it enshrines conflict in 
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any way with Ranke's slogan and the theory of historiography that 
that enshrines. But the problem, as so often in philosophy, is not 
to point out or clear up obvious errors, but to explain why some 
philosophers and philosophizing historians say the extraordinary 
things they do say. The diagnosis involves, I believe, three related 
errors which are by no means trivial, but deeply embedded in some 
of the ways in which we, when we are not philosophizing, talk about 
the past. The first, which I shall lable The Spatialization of The 
Past, arises from our inveterate habit of using metaphors which 
suggest that The Past is a territory, a realm or a region in which 
events are located as objects are in space. The second, which I 
shall lable the Confrontation Theory of Knowledge, is that of 
taking, as the paradigm of all knowledge, a situation in which we 
can literally see or grasp something, have it now before our eyes or 
in our hands. The third is a less familiar and more subtle error, 
that of confusing facts with events: confusing, for example, the event 
which was Lincoln's death, an event that occurred over 100 years 
ago, with the fact that Lincoln died in 1865, which is still a fact 
here and now. 
The metaphor of The Past as a territory which the historian 
explores and in which he finds events as objects comes out clearly 
in the opening paragraph of Becker's essay. 
"Everyone knows what the past is. We all have a comforting 
sense that it lies behind us, like a stretch of uneven country 
we have crossed; and it is often difficult to avoid the notion 
that one could easily, by turning around, walk back into 
this country of the past. That, at all events, is what we 
commonly think of the historian as doing: he works in the 
past, he explores the past in order to find out what men did 
and thought in the past. His business is to discover and set 
forth the 'facts' of history."4 
Events, according to this metaphor, are objects located in The 
Past in the way that towns and villages are located in the State of 
Kansas. If we want to refresh our memories of the towns and 
villages through which we have just passed or to learn more about 
them, we can always retrace our steps and examine them in greater 
detail. This Spatialization of The Past is connected with the Con-
frontation Theory of Knowledge, since the suggestion is clearly 
• Becker, op. cit. p. 120. 
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that we are entitled to speak of knowledge of The Past only if we 
can return into it and have the events that it contains right there 
before our eyes, if we can pick them up, handle them, and examine 
them closely on all sides. But this, alas!, is just what historians can 
never do. And because they can never revisit The Past, they can 
never re·examine it and thus come to know it better. It is true 
that this is only a metaphor and that Becker is about to break down 
the comfortable illusion that the metaphor engenders; but the 
significant fact is that, in the course of breaking down the illusion, 
he never questions the metaphor itself. The naive view, he seems 
to say, is that The Past is a territory that we can revisit and explore; 
the true view is that it is a territory that we cannot. But in fact our 
inability to revisit The Past is an a priori inability; it makes no 
sense to speak either of doing so or of failing to do so; and the 
morals to be drawn are not those that Constructionists draw, that 
there are no hard facts and that historical events never actually 
happened, but that events are not spatial objects and that historical 
knowledge is not an affair of witnessing past events. 
The same combination of spatialization and confrontation comes 
out well in the work of Professor Jack Meiland, who uses it first to 
support a sceptical view and then to support a Constructionist view 
of historical knowledge. "The historian," he writes, "should not 
be regarded as trying to discover facts about an independently 
existing realm of past events"; and he thinks it important to insist 
on this because historians typically, and according to Meiland 
wrongly, "regard themselves as probing a realm called 'the past' 
and detecting events, institutions, trends and so on that are lodged 
in that realm.''" But it is only by pressing these spatial metaphors 
harder than they will bear that scepticism can get a foothold. If a 
piece of food is uncomfortably lodged in my teeth, the dentist will 
probe my mouth-the realm in which it is lodged-to remove it. 
And if he is unsuccessful the first and second times, he may return 
again and again to his probing because my mouth is still there-
still, in the philosophical jargon, 'exists in the present'-for him to 
probe into. In the same way, a historian, worried by a problem, 
might be said to return to it again and again in his search for a 
solution. The spatial words 'return' and 'search' provide apt 
metaphors for the historian's activity-so apt indeed that we no 
"Scepticism and Historical Knowledge. New York: Random House, 1965, pp. 
192, 190. (My italics.) 
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longer think of them as metaphors at all. But what the historian 
does could, at the cost of being pedestrian, be described without 
using any metaphors at all. "I tried the day before yesterday to 
make up my mind as to whether Danton instigated the September 
Massacres or not, and I failed; I tried again yesterday, and I still 
failed; so I shall try again today." 
To say that the problem still exists is simply to say that it has not 
yet been solved, that I do not yet know what I want to know; but 
this in no way entails that Danton's instigation of the massacres (if 
he did instigate them) still exists. We are only tempted to suppose 
that it does if we are under the illusion that to think truly about 
Danton and his activities is to have them here and now 'before our 
minds' in some quite literal sense which entails their present 
existence. If we take this view seriously, we cannot think about 
Danton at all, since he died long ago. We can think about Mr. 
Nixon, but only about what he is doing now, not about what he 
said or did in the election campaign of 1968, because those events 
are lodged in the inaccessible Past. That this absurdity is no 
vagary of philosophers, who are well known to be professional 
purveyors of absurdity, I shall now try to show by examining 
Becker's essay in some detail. 
n 
Becker raised the questions 'Where is the historical fact?' and 
'When is the historical fact?' and his answer to both these was, as 
I said, 'Here and now in the mind of the historian.' I want now 
to suggest to you that his answer to the first of these questions is a 
wrong answer and that the second question is an absurd question 
which can only seem to arise because a wrong answer has been 
given to the firsL 
"Where now," asks Becker, "is the historical fact that Lincoln 
was assassinated in Ford's Theater on the 14th of April, 1865?" 
Notice, first, that he does not ask where the historical event1 Lin-
coln's assassination, is but where the historical fact is. That is 
correct; for we do not think or speak of past events as existing now, 
so that we are not even tempted to ask where they now are; but this 
is precisely how we do speak of historical facts. It is (still) a fact 
that Lincoln was assassinated. The first answer to this question 
that Becker considers is "The fact is in the records-in contemporary 
newspapers, diaries etc.'' This answer, which I believe to be cor-
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rect, he rejects for a reason that is so packed with epistemological 
errors that it is worth quoting in full. 
"The records are after all only paper, over the surface of 
which ink has been distributed in certain patterns. And even 
these patterns were not made by the actual occurrence, the 
assassination of Lincoln. The patterns are themselves only 
'histories' of the event, made by someone who had in his mind 
an image or idea of Lincoln's assassination. Of course we, 
you and I, can, by looking at these inky patterns, form in 
our minds images or ideas more or less like those in the mind 
of the person who made the patterns. But if there were now 
no one in the world who could make any meaning out of the 
patterned records or sources, the fact of Lincoln's assassina-
tion would cease to be an historical fact."B 
One error here, of which I wish I had time to say more, is the 
assumption that historiography is entirely a matter of testimony; 
we are only entitled to assert something as an historical fact if it 
was somewhere placed on record, a record we can read and under-
stand.7 The second assumption is that knowing that Lincoln died-
even just thinking about Lincoln's death in some other way, such 
as wondering how he died-is an affair of having images before one's 
mind. A third is the related error of supposing that understanding 
someone else's statement that Lincoln died is an affair of having 
images more or less similar to the images that he has or had. 
Having, erroneously as I think, rejected this answer, Becker 
goes on to consider another, which he also rejects. 
"At all events, the historical facts lying dead in the records, 
can do nothing good or evil in the world. They become his-
torical facts, capable of doing work, of making a difference, 
only when someone, you or I, brings them alive in our minds 
by means of pictures, images or ideas of the actual occurrence. 
For this reason I say that the historical fact is in someone's 
mind or it is nowhere, because when it is in no one's mind, 
it lies in the records inert, incapable of making a difference 
0 Becker, op. cit. pp. 125·26. 
• R. G. Collingwood's distinction between 'critical history' which is based on 
testimony and 'scientific history,' which is based on evidence (Tire Idea of 
History, pp. 258·82) is of great importance; yet it is usually ignored by historians, 
when they are not writing history but writing about historiography. For ex· 
ample, Louis Gottschalk, in Understanding History, has much to say about the 
proper approach to testimony but nothing at all about evidence. 
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in the world. . . . But perhaps you will say that the assassina-
tion of Lincoln has made a difference in the world, and that 
this difference is even now effectively working, even if, for 
a moment, or an hour or a week, no one in the world has the 
image of the actual occurrence in mind."B 
Becker agrees that Lincoln's assassination did make a difference to 
the world and that this difference is now effectively working. But 
he rejects this answer to his question on the grounds that "it is the 
persisting historical fact, rather than the ephemeral actual event, 
which makes a difference to us now; and the historical fact makes 
a difference only because it is, and in so far as it is, in human 
minds." 
Now this last statement is simply untrue. It is, of course, true 
that there is one sort of difference that historical facts make only 
when and because people think about them. What we do, as in-
dividuals and as nations, notoriously depends on how we think of 
ourselves, in particular how we think of our past. Perhaps the 
British would not have responded as they did to Churchill's call in 
1940 if they had no traditions about Drake and Raleigh and Nelson. 
(Perhaps too our naval strategy would not have been so inept but 
for those same traditions.) But all this is as true of historical fictions, 
of George Washington and the cherry tree and of the Black Hole 
of Calcutta, as it is of historical facts. Moreover, this is not, or is 
not the only type of difference that Becker had in mind. He clearly 
had in mind differences of quite another kind, differences made, 
not by people's beliefs, true or false, about their past, but by the 
actual events of their past; and these differences do not only exist 
as and when people are thinking about them. 
Historians are usually reluctant to speculate about what would 
have happened if: if Pompey had defeated Caesar; if the Moslems 
had defeated the Christians in the ninth century, if Louis XVI had 
not been caught and turned back at Varennes. But if they want to 
say, as Becker clearly does, that some historical events have 'made 
a difference,' they are committed to such counter-factual specula-
tions, even if only of a very broad and sketchy kind. They are 
committed to the view that things are now other than they would 
have been if the event in question had not occurred. Becker pre-
sumably had in mind some such thesis as this: If Lincoln had lived 
a few years longer, Reconstruction in the South would have taken 
• Becker, op. cit. p. 126. 
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a very different course; there would have been far less bitterness 
between blacks and whites; the Democratic Party would not have 
enjoyed a solid majority in the South for the next hundred years, 
and so on. These differences persist, are still "alive and effectively 
working" today in the sense that it is quite likely that, if Lincoln 
had lived a few more years, Mr. Nixon would not now be in the 
White House and Mr. Wallace would not be figuring out how to 
get there in 1972. But it is quite clear that these differences, as 
opposed to the image-of-our-nation's-past differences, do not exist 
only when someone happens to be thinking about Lincoln's death. 
You might as well argue that the difference in the illumination of 
a room caused by someone's pressing the switch only persists while 
he is thinking about his pressing of the switch. There must be 
hosts of events, especially in the remote past, which have made an 
enormous difference to our lives even if no one now thinks, or 
even could think, about them. The invention of the wheel is an 
example. It is a platitude that an historian is not entitled to assert 
'as a fact' that such and such an event occurred unless he has-here 
and now-adequate evidence; but this gives no support either to the 
view that 'Lincoln's death is an historical fact' means 'the con-
sequences of Lincoln's death are still with us' or to the view that 
these consequences exist only when someone happens to be think-
ing about them. 
I turn now to the first of Becker's rejected answers: the his-
torical fact is in the records. A detective, at the end of his investiga-
tion, might lay a bulky file on the Chief Constable's desk with the 
words 'here, sir, are the facts' or 'here are all the facts you need to 
bring a charge against John Doe.' He might also hand the Chief 
Constable a carving knife with John Doe's finger-prints on the 
handle and traces of Richard Roe's blood on the blade. But these 
are not facts, for all that it is a fact that the finger-prints are Doe's 
and the blood Roe's. Nor is the event, the murder which took place 
weeks before, here and now in the room with the detective and the 
Chief Constable, either in their minds or between the covers of the 
file. This is not because the event is now somewhere else, in a 
place called The Past, for example; it is because it does not make 
sense to speak of an event which took place weeks ago as being 
now anywhere. (We do, of course, say that the murder is 'in the 
minds or the detective and the Chief Constable while they are 
discussing it; it might also be very much on their minds, if the 
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press and public are clamouring for results; and of course we also 
say that the event took place some time 'in the past.' But the first 
of these locutions only means that they are thinking of or are worried 
about the murder, and the second only that it occurred and is not 
now occurring. Yet, to make his point, the sceptic has to take 
these spatial metaphors seriously; and when he does so, his in· 
telligence is bewitched by language.) 
What, then, do we mean by such expressions as 'you will find 
the facts about sperm whales in any good encyclopedia'? Simply 
that you will find in any good encyclopedia reliable information 
about sperm whales. Or consider the sentence: You will find the 
true facts about the Black Hole of Calcutta, not in Macaulay, but 
in Bergen Evans' book, The Spoor of Spooks.9 This means, roughly: 
Macaulay told one story about the Black Hole; Bergen Evans tells 
quite a different story; Evans' story is substantially true, but 
Macaulay's is not. Similarly, 'we haven't got enough facts to go on' 
means 'we don't know enough,' and 'the facts won't all come to 
light till John publishes his memoires' means 'we shan't know all 
about this till John publishes his memoires and then we shall.' 
We use the expression 'it is a fact that .. .' mainly to contrast 
matters of fact with matters of taste and matters of opinion, with 
guesses, surmises, speculations, and hypotheses. 'I can tell you for 
a fact that'; 'we don't know all the facts'; 'you can't get round the 
fact that'; 'the lecturer got all his facts wrong'; facts are brute, cold, 
hard, stubborn, inescapable. The conclusion to which these and 
many other locutions with 'fact' point is that 'fact' is an epistemo-
logical word, not, like 'thing,' 'person,' 'event,' 'quality,' and 're-
lation' the name of an ontological category. There have been in 
the world, there are, and (we hope) there will be things, persons, 
events, qualities, relations, times, places, and so on. It is not my 
task to give a complete list of categories or to discuss the question 
whether some of these are 'reducible to' others. The point is that 
the word 'fact' must not appear in any such list, if only for the 
reason that there are facts in every category. It is a fact that Socrates 
was a man, that he was snub-nosed, that he was married to Xan-
thippe, that he lived in Athens, that he lived in the fifth century 
b.c. When I say that these are facts, I am vouching for, claiming to 
know or at least to have very good reason to believe, that the 
corresponding statements are true. One of the things that would 
• London, Michael Joseph, 1955, pp. 70·75. 
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prove me wrong would be Socrates' not being married to Xan-
thippe; but another would be the discovery that the evidence on 
which this belief of mine is based turns out to be mere gossip. 
(While I am sure that 'fact' is an epistemological word. I confess to 
being quite unsure how to place 'situation' and 'state of affairs.' 
Is the present situation in Northern Ireland as much 'in the 
world' as the inhabitants, their dissensions, their policies and their 
lack of policy are undoubtedly in the world? I do not know.) 
To say 'it is a fact that Lincoln was assassinated' is to comment, 
not on the ontological status of Lincoln's death, but on the epis-
temological status of the proposition that Lincoln was assassinated. 
It is, or it is certainly very like saying 'We know that Lincoln was 
assassinated' or 'that Lincoln was assassinated is beyond dispute'; 
and, like these expressions, it necessarily has a reference to people's 
minds-to what they know, what they believe, what they infer, what 
reasons they can give for asserting what they assert. But it is both 
easy and fatal to pass from this correct appreciation of the fact that 
all talk about facts is necessarily and always talk about people's 
minds to the quite grotesque position that when people say such 
things as 'it is a fact that Lincoln was assassinated,' Lincoln's as· 
sassination. the event, is something that exists now and only exists 
in their minds. That this is precisely the step that Becker does take 
is shown by his treatment of his next question: 'When is the his-
torical fact?'. Since he has concluded that the historical fact exists 
here, in our minds, it is not surprising that he goes on to say that 
the historical fact exists now. 
"I am thinking of the Congress of Berlin, and that is with-
out doubt history-the real thing. The historical facts of 
the Congress of Berlin I bring alive in memory, imaginatively. 
But I am making an image of the Congress of Berlin for a 
purpose; and indeed without a purpose no one would take 
the trouble to bring historical facts to mind. My purpose 
happens to be to convey this image of the Congress of 
Berlin to my class in History 42, in Room C, tomorrow 
afternoon at 3 o'clock. Now I find that inseparable from 
this image of the Congress of Berlin, which occurred in the 
past, are Hitting images of myself conveying this image of 
the Congress of Berlin to my class tomorrow in Room C. 
I picture myself standing there monotonously talking, I hear 
the labored sentences painfully issuing forth. I picture the 
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students' faces alert or bored as the case may be; so that 
images of this future event enter into the imagined picture 
of the Congress of Berlin, a past event; enter into it, coloring 
and shaping it too, to the end that the performance may do 
credit to me, or be intelligible to immature minds, or be com-
pressed within the limits of fifty minutes, or to accomplish 
some other desired end. Well, this living historical fact, this 
mixed image of ... the Congress of Berlin-is it past, present 
or future? I cannot say.''•o 
Becker is at a loss to tell us when this 'mixed image,' which he 
confuses with the Congress of Berlin, is or was or will be; but we 
can tell him. He is describing his own state of mind as he reflects 
on the business of lecturing about the Congress of Berlin; and this 
reDection took place-probably more than once-at some time be-
fore-probably not long before-he wrote the article in which this 
piece of phenomenological description occurs, some time in the 
nineteen twenties or thirties. Now I am far from wishing to decry 
phenomenological descriptions; in the hands of a James, a Proust, 
or a Joyce they have an honored place in literature; and perhaps 
all of us, as teachers and students, could learn much from what 
great teachers and students tell us about how they prepare their 
lectures. But what has all this to do with the Congress of Berlin, 
which took place in 1878, or with our knowledge that there was 
such a congress and of what was said and done there? Suppose that 
just after he has delivered his lecture on the Congress of Berlin 
we go up to Becker and challenge him. How do you know, we 
ask, that Bismark was sincere in the admiration he expressed for 
Disraeli or that Disraeli was not bluffing the Russians when he 
ordered a special train? How, in general, do you know that there 
ever was such a congress and that what you have told us was said 
and done there really was said and done? 1£ we were lucky enough 
to find him in historical rather than philosophical mood, he would 
not give us an account of the thoughts that passed through his mind 
while lecturing-still less of the images, relevant and irrelevant, with 
which those thoughts might or might not have been accompanied; 
he would give us his reasons for believing what he said in his lec-
ture, which is a very different matter. 
In giving us his reasons, Becker would have referred to docu-
ments published at the time and, more fruitfully, to documents 
10 Beckcr, op. cit. p. 128. 
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written at the time but not published; and he would have given us 
his reasons for believing (in part) what those documents contain. 
He would also, as Collingwood reminds us, have drawn inferences 
from what the participants did not say and did not do. (It was 
the remarkable behaviour of the dog which did not bark that led 
Sherlock Holmes to the right solution in Silver Blaze.) But in 
giving a phenomenological description of his state of mind in place 
of what we want, which is a reconstruction of the logic of his 
reasoning, Becker seems to be confusing the important truth that 
an historian should not assert anything as a fact unless he has, here 
and now, good reasons for so doing with the absurd view that the 
historian must be thinking all the time, not about the Congress of 
Berlin, but about the contents of his own consciousness. And this 
is precisely the error of passing from the truth of Oakeshott's slogan 
to the falsity of Ranke's. Perhaps I have not yet shown this to be 
an error; in the next section I shall argue that any sceptic who in· 
sists that it is not, insists that we must always be talking about our 
own 'experience,' is in for more trouble than he bargained for. 
III 
Scepticism is of interest here only as a stage on the road to the 
Constructionist view of historiography, the view that we can, after 
all, have knowledge of the past-provided we remember that it is 
not knowledge of the 'real past' as it actually happened, but of the 
'historical past' as the historian constructs it. I shall argue, first, 
that if the sceptical argument succeeds, our knowledge of the past 
cannot be salvaged by any theory of the past as a hypothetical con-
struct, and secondly that the sceptical argument cannot succeed. 
Three points about scepticism in general need to be borne in mind. 
First, the sceptic typically contrasts a class of objects that, he 
says, we cannot know with a corresponding class of objects that. he 
says, we can and do know. The Sceptic About Other Minds says 
that each of us can know in an unproblematic way much about his 
own mind, but cannot, or cannot in the same unproblematic way, 
know what is going on in the minds of others or even that Others 
have Minds at all; and the sceptic who says that we cannot know 
that all As are q, has no qualms about his knowledge that this is an 
A and that this A is q,. Secondly-though this is not always made 
explicit-the sceptic who trains his guns on a particular target will 
usually take for granted the unproblematic character of our 
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knowledge of those other targets on which his guns are not at the 
moment trained. Thus the Sceptic About Other Minds can often 
be found, openly or covertly, assuming the existence of Material 
Objects; and the Logical Positivists, in 'reducing' material objects 
to sense-data, often seemed to take for granted the existence of 
Actual or Hypothetical Observers, who are only Other Minds under 
another name. 
A third point to notice about scepticism is that the true sceptic 
has doubts about every application of the concept under attack. 
Scepticism about Memory, for example, is not a psychological 
worry as to the reliability of my memory in respect of what hap-
pened many years ago-a worry that can and does exist happily 
alongside complete confidence in my memory as to what happened 
a few minutes ago; it is an epistemological worry about memory in 
general as a source of knowledge. How, he wonders, can anything 
that he now thinks he remembers give any support at all to-let 
alone prove-some statement about how things were in the world at 
any time before now. 'How do I know that I have just had a 
beer?' is for him as worrisome a question as 'How do I know that 
I had a beer on the 14th of july, 1940?'. Similarly the Sceptic About 
The Past is as much worried by the recent as by the remote past. 
That is why Russell's conjecture that the world might have been 
created five minutes ago, complete as it now is with all the archae-
ological remains and all our present memories, fails to capture the 
spirit of Scepticism About The Past. What worries him is the 
little word 'ago'; and it matters not at all whether this little word 
appears in a proposition about what happened a million years or a 
millionth of a second ago. It is the past tense, as such, that worries 
him; and it worries him because he thinks that propositions in the 
past tense are somehow necessarily less certain, less secure than 
propositions in the present tense. Perhaps this is why the Idealist 
slogan 'all history is contemporary history' sounds so comforting; 
historical statements, it seems to say, are not about the problematic 
Past but about the unproblematic Present. I shall now argue that 
this comfort is illusory; no salvation lies in rejecting the real past, 
as what actually happened, in favour of the historical past, as a 
present hypothetical construct. 
What is gained, if the sceptical argument is right, by the claim 
that "the past that the historian evokes is not a real past as it was 
17 
when it was present, but ... a hypothetical construct"?11 At an 
early stage in his investigation the detective will-at least if crime 
fiction is to be trusted-'reconstruct' the crime. He will 'construct 
a hypothesis' to the effect that it was John Doe who killed Richard 
Roe, and just how and when and why he killed him. There is a 
point, at this stage, in saying that the detective's theory is 'only 
hypothetical.' this phrase being used to mark the fact that he is 
not yet prepared to say that this is what did, or must have hap-
pened; only that it may or might have happened. But, if all goes 
well with his investigation, there will come a time when the evi-
dence obliges him to believe that what he formerly surmised must 
indeed have been the case. What now can be the point of referring 
to the murder by John Doe of Richard Roe as a hypothetical con-
struct? It would be rather odd to say, when we have conclusive 
evidence, that the detective's theory is still 'only a hypothesis'; to 
say at any time that the murder (if there was one) is a hypothetical 
construct is catastrophic, since 'hypothesis,' like 'fact' is an epistemo-
logical word. 
The arguments used to show that historical events, the events 
mentioned in history books, are hypothetical constructs, must, as 
I said, apply equally to all past events, even to an event so humble 
as my having had eggs for breakfast this morning. This event, ac-
cording to the Constructionist, is a hypothetical construct con-
structed to explain the present state of my digestive organs. Is this 
too, the present state of my digestion, a hypothetical construct? If 
the Constructionist says that it is not-his being a theory about past 
events only-we may ask him how this morning's hypothetical eggs 
can explain the present real state of my digestive organs. And 
why should the present state of my organs provide any more sup-
port for this hypothesis than some other-for example that I ate 
iron filings or arsenic or nothing at all? At this point the Sceptic 
About The Past is covertly relying on an unproblematic knowledge 
of the present state of my digestion and an unproblematic general 
knowledge of the different effects on human digestive organs of 
eggs, iron filings and arsenic-knowledge to which, as I shall try to 
show, he has no title if he cannot have an equally unproblematic 
knowledge of the past. 
Or suppose that I complain to the doctor of pains in my abdo· 
men. On the basis of what I tell him and of what he finds when 
11 Goldstein, op. cit. p. 177. 
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he feels my body with his hands, he constructs the tentative hypoth-
esis that I have an inOamed appendix because some small object 
which I had previously swallowed is lodged there. Finally he cuts 
me open and finds a small stone in my appendix. Will the Con-
structionist say that the stone, when he finds it 'in the present' is 
a real one, but that when it got into my appendix it was not? If 
the Constructionist is telling us that the doctor's diagnosis was 
'constructed,' meaning by this that it was not a report of his present 
experience when he felt my body but was arrived at by applying 
general concepts and general knowledge that he had acquired from 
books and from years of experience, we need not quarrel with him. 
That is uncontentious; but it in no way supports the view that the 
stone, when it entered my body, was less real than it is now when 
the doctor finds it or the view that the entry of the stone into my 
appendix was not something that actually happened. Indeed, if it 
did not actually happen, the doctor's diagnosis was mistaken; for, 
once again, if the evidence obliges us to believe anything at all, it 
obliges us to believe that such and such actually happened. 
Perhaps someone will say that my insistence on the point that if 
Scepticism About The Past is valid at all it applies to the recent 
past as much as to the past studied by historians totally misses the 
point of historical scepticism, and thereby misses the point of a 
constructionist theory. What worries the historian is precisely the 
fact that, in his work, there is nothing which corresponds to the 
doctor's finding the stone in my story. The doctor's hypothesis 
about the stone can be verified by finding it; the historian's cannot 
be verified in any such way. About this argument two things need 
to be said. The first is that historians are often faced with genuine 
difficulties of this kind. Since modern governments keep reliable 
statistical records we can discover, if we wish, how many people 
lived in London in 1950. But an historian might want to know 
more accurately than he does how many people lived in London in 
1450 or in Athens in 450 b.c.; and this, perhaps, he will never know 
since no records were kept and there is no other way of finding 
out. But it is essential not to confuse, as we so often do, the his-
torian's genuine lament 'If only I could find out the truth about 
such and such which, for contingent reasons, I cannot!' with the 
sceptic's sweeping, non-contingent, pseudo-lament 'If only I could 
find out the truth about anything at all in the past, but necessarily 
I cannot!'; and it is only the latter type of scepticism that gives rise 
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to a supposed need to re-interpret historical knowledge in a con-
structionist way. 
The second point to be made is that it is just untrue to say that 
there is, and can be, nothing in history to correspond to the doc-
tor's verification of his diagnosis; in fact Goldstein himself provides 
a very striking example of just this. 
"The German historian Giesebrecht pointed out that certain 
chronicles of the eleventh century drew their information 
from a common source which was no longer available. So 
sure was he of their dependence on this very early chronicle 
... that he constructed the missing manuscript from these 
later derivatives. Some twenty years later the missing 
chronicle was found, and it confirmed these shrewd con-
jectures in every important particular. "12 
It would certainly be proper to say that Giesebrecht 'constructed' 
the theory that there must have been a chronicle which was now 
missing, that he 'reconstructed' this chronicle, and that, at this 
stage, his theory was 'only a hypothesis.' But when the missing 
chronicle turned up, his theory changed its status from that of 
hypothesis to that of established fact. What we must not do-and 
what the sceptic must do to get his argument going-is to refer to 
the chronicle itself or to its past existence as hypothetical constructs. 
Between the time when Giesebrecht published his reconstruction 
and the time of the discovery of the chronicle, no doubt people 
said 'Giesebrecht's chronicle is only a hypothesis.' But this must be 
taken as a compendious fafon de parlerj the Constructionist's posi-
tion depends on taking it au pied de Ia lettre. 
I shall now argue that Scepticism About The Past is untenable 
on the grounds that every argument the sceptic uses can be turned 
with equal cogency on The Present and, ultimately, on any knowl-
edge that, while denying knowledge of The Past, he supposes him-
self to have. 
(I) It will be remembered that Becker's scepticism and Mei-
land's both stemmed, at least in part, from a contrast that they 
think we can draw between our ability to revisit and explore a 
territory and our inability to revisit and explore The Past. Sup-
pose that we are out for a walk and begin to wonder whether there 
were five or six pine trees in the clump we passed half an hour ago. 
"Goldstein, op. cit. p. 182. 
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If it is important for us to settle this question, we can retrace our 
steps and count the trees. But this, says the sceptic, is just what the 
historian cannot do; he cannot retrace his steps into The Past to 
satisfy himself as to the existence and nature of some event which 
he believes to have occurred there. As an argument for Scepticism 
About The Past this is a non-starter because it presupposes that 
we can have knowledge of the very kind that the sceptic uses it 
to show that we cannot have; our supposedly unproblematic knowl-
edge in the spatial case, whose function is to throw into relief the 
problematic character of our knowledge in the temporal case, turns 
out to depend on the possibility of temporal knowledge. For con-
sider: we first passed the pine trees at ten o'clock; our doubt oc-
curred and we began to retrace our steps at ten thirty; when we 
regain the pine trees and count them it is eleven. But how can the 
discovery at eleven o'clock that there are now six trees settle, or 
even have any bearing on, the doubt we had at ten thirty, which 
was itself a doubt as to how many there were at ten? Revisiting 
the trees and counting them is a relevant procedure only if we are 
entitled to assume that pine trees do not come to be or pass away 
or move around within the hour, to assume that finding six trees 
now is relevant to the question whether there were six trees then. 
In short, the Sceptic About History can only get his argument going 
if he is allowed not to be a Sceptic About Geography as well; but 
his assumed knowledge of geography depends on his ability to have 
knowledge of history. 
(2) There are many concepts that can be applied in the present 
tense only if certain other concepts can be applied in the past tense. 
John cannot now be sobering up if he was not formerly drunk; 
James cannot now be recovering from snakebite i£ he was not for-
merly bitten by a snake; Peter cannot now stop beating his wife if 
he never beat her, and Paul cannot now be catching a fly ball that 
no one formerly hit into the air. An extension of this line of 
thought will greatly impoverish, even i£ it does not entirely elimi-
nate, all our talk about The Present. 
(3) What is the Constructionist to make of such assertions as 
that skirts are now being worn shorter than they used to be? This 
is a statement about both The Present and The Past; but the word 
'now' does not refer to an instant of time (if there are such things); 
it means 'nowadays' and is used to contrast a stretch of time, in 
this case about ten years, with an earlier time. My point now is not 
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that this assertion could not be true unless skirts were, actually 
were, worn longer at an earlier time; it is the stronger point that 
it would not even be intelligible unless we were able to apply 
temporal concepts. At this point the Constructionist has two 
choices. He can say, first, that since his is a theory about The Past, 
the length of skirts in 1961 is a hypothetical construct, but their 
length in 1971, being a present fact, is not. This is the line that 
Becker seems to take; but there are formidable difficulties about it, 
chief among which is the question as to how hypothetical past eggs 
could account for the present real state of my stomach. The sug-
gestion that, in the statement about the comparative lengths of 
skirts, we are comparing a real length with a hypothetically con-
structed length is, to say the least, rather odd; and the onus is cer-
tainly on the Constructionist to explain not only why he says it but 
what it means. 
Alternatively, the Constructionist might take the line that the 
present length of skirts is also a hypothesis constructed to explain 
something, and Goldstein's assimilation of 'the real past' to Hylas's 
material substance suggests that this is the line he would take. 
But if so, let us be clear that what is at stake has nothing specially 
to do with history. On this view, if past events are constructs, so 
also is the fight of which a sports commentator gives a blow-by-blow 
account as it is fought before his very eyes; what is at stake is not 
Scepticism About The Past, but a much wider scepticism that 
threatens to become total, hence unsayable, hence uninteresting. 
Consider the proposition that skirts are now being worn eight 
inches above the knee, a proposition wholly about The Present. 
What could be the ground for saying that the present length of 
skirts is a hypothetical construct? Perhaps it is that the remark is 
a Universal Proposition about all or most skirts or a remark 
about something as abstract as a fashion. If so, what of the proposi-
tion that Mary's skirt is, here and now, eight inches above her 
knee? Is the length of her skirt a hypothetical construct? If so, 
is the skirt itself? Is her knee? If all of these are called hypothetical 
constructs, it is beginning to emerge that the ultimate reason for 
calling anything a hypothetical construct is simply this: in naming 
it or referring to it, we are not just pointing to it, the bare particu-
lar, but using some such general term as 'length,' 'skirt' or 'knee.' 
To use such general terms is already to employ general concepts, 
to classify this object as a skirt, that object as a knee. And, says 
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the sceptic, the concepts we employ might be other than what they 
are. So all our references to objects are 'hypothetical' in the rather 
strained sense of being tentative, provisional, liable to alteration if 
our language changes. 
I am by no means convinced that the proposition that all our 
concepts might be other than they arc, which is the foundation of 
all scepticism and hence of all constructionism, is true or even in-
telligible. But if it is true, it empties the concept of a hypothetical 
construct of all useful meaning. For it now appears that whenever 
we say anything at all we must be talking about hypothetical con-
structs; the "experienced objects that Philonous wants to talk 
about" are either just as much hypothetical constructs as Hylas' 
material things or they are unmentionable. For, whereof one can-
not speak, thereof one must be silent. The Sceptic About The Past 
who takes this line cannot stop short at Scepticism About The Past, 
but must end, like Cratylus, not talking but pointing. 
This brings me to two final arguments for historical scepticism 
that I can only deal with very briefly. It is often said that we can-
not give an account of the past as it actually was because each 
generation necessarily sees the past through the eyes of the present. 
The historian selects and arranges facts; he does this in a manner 
made possible by his contemporary scheme of concepts which may 
well be different from that of an earlier or of a later historian; and 
this, it is said, implies that he distorts, necessarily distorts the facts. 
But once again the sceptical argument confuses a genuine insight 
with a falsehood. It is an obvious, though perhaps not a trivial, 
truth that an historian can only say things in the language he has 
got, which may well be different from the language used by the 
people about whom he is writing. It may also be richer. We can 
say that real wages were falling continuously and rather rapidly dur-
ing the first half of the seventeenth century; agricultural laborers 
at that time could not have said that-for all that they must have 
known that their pennies bought less and less each year. But it does 
not follow that this statement about real wages is not true or that 
it is, in any pejorative sense, a distortion of the facts. To say that 
would imply-what might, of course, be true, but does not have to 
be-that the records on which our statement is based were unrepre· 
sentative or in some other way inadequate, or that we had misinter-
preted them. To interpret figures is not necessarily, as the sceptic 
implies, to misinterpret them. Moreover, the argument, if valid, 
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would apply equally to the present; from the fact that a tribe has 
no expression for 'matrilinear kinship system,' perhaps because it 
has never occurred to them that society could be organized in any 
other way, it does not follow that they have not (really) got such a 
system. 
This pseudo-lament that historians cannot help distorting the 
past is connected with my last point-the idea that Ranke's ideal is 
impossible because we cannot know everything that actually hap. 
pened. We swear in court to tell the whole truth; but who could 
possibly do that? The argument, which is closely paralleled in 
Becker and elsewhere, runs as follows: The witness swears that he 
saw John Doe, whom he knows by sight, running away from the 
scene of the crime. But if it was really John Doe, it was a man 
who weighs exactly one hundred and eighty-six pounds, has a mole 
of precisely such and such a shape on his left forearm, can do multi-
plication but not quadratics, likes his steak medium rare, and so on. 
But the witness cannot possibly swear to all of that; consequently 
he does not, and cannot, know the whole truth. The witness's state-
ment is a simplified, hence a distorted, account of what actually 
happened. This argument commits two errors. First, it confuses 
truth with wealth of detail; it suggests that the statement that 
Caesar crossed the Rubicon is untrue, or at best distorted, because 
it does not tell us at what time of day he embarked, how many men 
he took with him and what their names were. Secondly it trades on 
lamenting the impossibility of fulfilling an ideal that it is logically 
impossible to fulfill. 
Suppose we rephrase Ranke's remark to read 'the task of the 
historian is to list all the events that have actually happened.' We 
could no more embark on this task than we could embark on that 
of listing everything in this room if we were not told what is to 
count as a 'thing.' Is the chair on which I now sit one thing, a 
chair? Or five things, four legs and a seat? Or millions and mil-
lions of things, sub-atomic particles? Normally the context will tell 
us what is to count as a thing, and the same is true of history; in 
a small-scale work the French Revolution will be one event, in a 
larger scale work it will be many. Once again, the pseudo-lament 
'Alas! we can never know everything' is a metaphysical sigh over a 
logical impossibility; but it is the shadow, the monstrous Doppel-
gaenger, of a very genuine difficulty. Very often historians cannot 
find out as much detail as they need to find out in order to support 
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some interesting account or interpretation, to solve some historical 
problem. That is just too bad; it means that many a fine historical 
thesis, about the rise of the gentry for example, can never be 
adequately established; but this by no means entails that no his-
torical thesis can ever be established; and it is a perennial source 
both of hope and of delight that, since historians began to use 
evidence rather than testimony as the basis for their theories, they 
have discovered all sorts of novel ways of finding out what actually 
happened. 
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The E. H. Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund was established 
in 1941 in memory of Ernest H . Lindley, Chancellor of the Univer-
sity of Kansas from 1920 to 1939. In February 1941 Mr. Roy Rob-
erts, the chairman of the committee in charge, suggested in the 
Graduate Magazine that 
the Chancellor should invite to the University for a lecture or 
a series of lectures, some outstanding national or world figure 
to speak on "Values of Living"-just as the late Chancellor 
proposed to do in his courses "The Human Situation" and 
"Plan for Living.'' 
ln the following June Mr. Roberts circulated a letter on behalf of 
the Committee, proposing in somewhat broader terms that 
The income from this fund should be spent in a quest of 
social bettennenL by bringing to the University each year 
outstanding world leaders for a lecture or series of lectures, 
yet with a design so broad in its outline that in the years to 
come, if it is deemed wise, this living memorial could take 
some more desirable form. 
The fund was allowed to accumulate until 1954, when Professor 
Richard McKeon lectured on "Human Rights and International 
Relations." The next lecture was given in 1959 by Professor Everett 
C. Hughes, and has been published by the University o f Kansas 
School of Law as part of his book Students' Culture and Perspec-
tives: Lectures on Medical and General Education. The selection 
of lecturers for the Lindley series has since been delegated to the 
Department of Philosophy. The following lectures have been pub-
lished, and may be obtained from the Department at a price of 
seventy-five cents each . 
19GI. "The Idea of Man-An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology:· 
By J ose Ferrater Mora, Professor of Philosophy. Bryn Mawr College. 
1962. "Changes in E\·ents and Changes in Things." 
By A. N. Prior, Profcs.wr of Philosophy, University of Manchester. 
1%3. "Moral Philosophy and tbe Analysis of Language." 
By Richard B. Brandt, Professor of Philosophy. Swarthmore Collt-gc. 
1964. "Human Freedom and the Self." 
ny Roderick M. Chisholm, Professor of Philosophy, £\rown University. 
196!i. "Frct-dom of Mind." 
By Stuart Hampshire, Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University. 
19()6. "Some Beliefs about Justice." 
Uy William K. Frankcna, Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan. 
1967. "Fonn and Content in Ethical Theory." 
By Wilfrid Sellars, f'rofc~sor of Philosophy, University of l'il!sburgh. 
1%8. " The S)·sternatic Unity of Value." 
By J . N. Findlay, Clark Professor of Philosophy, Yale University. 
19G9. "llubcr and Buberism-A Critical Evaluation." 
By Paul Edwards, Professor of Philosophy, Brooklyn College of the City 
University of New York. 
